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“Why spend years attempting to create wealth and then take so little care to provide for 
loved ones, friends, or charity.  The present rules governing your estate if you die without 
a will have scant regard for your wishes… There are no excuses for not making or 
reviewing your will.  Act now before it’s too late.”  Ian Burman, Probate lawyer, “When 
to Write a Will”  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4332463.htm.  March 10, 2005 
 
“Every adult – whether they are wealthy or not – should have a valid will.  Yet, over half 
of all Americans die without one.  In fact, national estimates project that 70% of 
American adults currently don’t have a will.  The reasons for this are common.  Many 
people think they don’t have enough property to worry about or that writing a will might 
be too expensive.  Others simply prefer not to think about the subject at all…If your 
state’s distribution laws work fine for you does that mean you shouldn’t write a will?  
Well, not exactly.  After all, having a will takes the guesswork out of who will receive 
what.  And why not help avoid potential family feuds over where your property will go? 
… Having a will not only provides clear guidance for your loved ones after your death, 
but it also allows you to rest easy, knowing your wishes will be carried out.  The peace of 
mind you gain will be well worth any expense or effort involved in drafting a will.  After 
all, we all want to take care of our loved ones.  Writing a will is one way to make sure 
they’re cared for even after you’re gone.”  Legalzoom.com advertising $69 Wills. 
 
“Unless you make a Will, you cannot guarantee that your belongings will be distributed 
as you want when you die.”  Clickdocs.co.uk 
 
“Why let someone else decide how to dispose of assets you worked hard to acquire.” 
Elderhostel.com – a non-for-profit encouraging wills that include bequests to Elderhostel. 
 
“If you die without a will, California law will determine the beneficiaries of you estate.  
Contrary to popular myth, everything does not automatically go to the state… Friends, a 
non-registered domestic partner or your favorite charities will receive nothing if you die 
without a will.”  The State Bar of California, “Wills” Calbar.ca.gov  3
I. Motivation  
Will writing is a crucial part of the bequest process.  In writing a will, an 
individual can choose who receives what portion of his assets, can give specific 
belongings to particular beneficiaries, and can provide for charities.  By contrast, the 
assets of an individual who dies with out a will, or intestate, are divided among 
beneficiaries in a manner specified by the state or country in which he lived.  Estimates 
of the percent of Americans who write wills before they die range from 30% to 50%.  
The existence of wills gives some indication concerning bequest motives.  In particular, 
will writers anticipate that they are going to die with some positive estate value, care 
about who receives their assets, and are willing to occur a financial cost to pay for the 
drafting of a will.   The goal of this paper is to investigate the decision to write a will in 
hopes that the motivations behind this decision will shed some light on bequest motives 
more generally.   
Bequest motives are poorly understood despite a substantial body of research 
seeking to understand the impetus for the posthumous distribution of assets.  The two 
principal economic theories of bequests – altruism and strategic bequests or exchange– 
fail to explain significant features of observed bequest behavior.  One finding that is 
particular challenging to these two theories is the prevalence of equal bequests to 
children.  However, few alternative explanations have been offered in place of these two 
theories.  The frequency of equal bequests to children also draw into question why 
individuals write wills, given that estates are divided equally among children in the 
absence of wills.   
Gaining a better grasp of bequest motives and the pattern of bequests can lead to a 
better understanding of key macroeconomic phenomenon.   For example, further insight 
into bequest motives can help explain the rationale for the patterns of observed saving 
behavior and can lead to a better understanding of the sources of wealth inequality.  In 
addition, understanding bequest motives can clarify likely responses to policy changes 
such as an abolition of the estate tax or changes in social security policy parameters.   
I investigate bequest motives by looking at the will writing decision of a set of 
individuals who died in Ireland between 1901 and 1905.  I link the estate records of these 
individuals to their household record in the 1901 Irish Census.   The Census provides   4
similar information on individuals who write wills -- testators, and the intestate.  The 
advantage of looking at this particular time period derives from the fact that it predates 
government provided old age support in Ireland.  As a result, the linkages between 
parents and their children are less nuanced and more explicit than in the time periods and 
locations analyzed in most studies of bequest motives.  I would anticipate strategic 
bequest motives to be far more pronounced because parents were more heavily dependent 
on their children in old age.   In addition, in the turn of the century Irish context, estate 
taxes were low relative to current levels so I am able to abstract away from the tax 
avoidance component of modern estate planning. 
I find some evidence that will-writing is motivated by the desire to repay 
individuals who provided care after the end of a dying person’s productive years, 
especially among women.   By contrast I find no evidence that the characteristics of 
potential beneficiaries influence the decision to write a will.  I do find that the age, 
wealth, and landholding status of the deceased are correlated with will writing.  These 
additional findings are consistent with the strategic bequest model and also with a simple 
model of bequests where individuals write wills because they have assets and think they 
are about to die.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  First, I introduce the principal theories of 
bequests and how these theories have been tested in previous research.  I then present a 
simple model of the decision to write a will and discuss the implications of the model.  
Next I introduce the Irish context and the data set.  Subsequently, I investigate which 
features of potential testators influence their decision to write a will and explore the 
extent to which the various theories can explain the patterns found in the data.  I then 
conclude. 
 
II. Understanding Bequest Motives 
  According to the basic life-cycle model, individuals save in order to support 
consumption above their income levels in the later years of life.   With perfect foresight 
concerning the timing of death, individuals would run out of assets at the moment of 
death leaving no bequests to their heirs.  The presence of substantial bequests has been 
explained in the literature primarily by three different theories; accidental bequests,   5
strategic bequests, and altruism.  When the life-cycle model is extended to include 
uncertainty over the time of death, the prediction of accidental bequests arises.  
According to this theory, bequests are insurance for living too long.   The accidental 
theory is inconsistent with the existence of wills.  While bequests themselves may be 
accidental, the distribution decisions made by will are not accidental, but deliberate 
actions by individuals to distribute their assets under the assumption that there is 
something left to distribute.   In addition, wills are not costless to draw up indicating that 
testators are willing to sacrifice some consumption in order to have a will.   
  The strategic bequest or exchange theory postulates that bequests are used to 
procure services from heirs that are not available in the market-place.   For instance, a 
child who takes care of an elderly parent receives a disproportionate bequest in exchange 
for those care-giving services.  Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers (1985) finds some 
support for this theory in that they find that parents who hold more bequeathable wealth 
receive more attention from their children.  Perozek (1999) further investigates the link 
between estate size and attention from children and does not find more interaction 
between parents and adult children when parents hold more bequeathable wealth.  Her 
work also challenges the exchange theory in that she finds that only children, who have 
no competition for their parents’ resources, spend as much time with their parents as 
children in multi-child families.    
Another theory that has been investigated as an explanation for bequest behavior 
is that bequests are motivated by altruism. (Wilhelm 1996) According to this theory, 
individuals care about the well-being of their heirs, and distribute their assets to 
maximize the utility of heirs.  The assumption that the well-being of other individuals 
enters into the deceased’s utility function equally, leads to the prediction that bequests to 
these individuals should compensate for pre-existing differences in wealth or earning 
potential.  Because the lower wealth individual has a higher marginal utility of income 
under the standard assumption of declining marginal utility of income, he should receive 
a larger bequest.  Research on the division of bequests does not support the prediction 
that bequests compensate for differential endowments.   
In contrast to the predictions of both the exchange and altruism models, data on 
bequests finds that bequests to children are in most cases equal. Equal division has been   6
found to be the norm in a number of different data sets.  In the Estate-Income Tax Match 
data, Wilhelm (1996) found that 68.6% of estates were divided exactly equally, and 
76.6% were divided within 2% of equality.   Light and McGarry (2003) report that 92.1% 
of mothers in their sample from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) respond that 
they plan to divide their estate equally among their children.  Using North Carolina estate 
records, Norton and Taylor (2005) find that between 70% and 83% of estates were 
divided equally.   
Some research has also advanced other theories of bequests.  In particular, 
Andreoni (1990) postulates that giving is motivated by the “warm glow” received by the 
giver and McGranahan (2000) finds evidence that bequests to charity are motivated by 
the desire to be remembered in a favorable manner.   
More recent articles on bequests have sought to understand bequest motives in the 
context of the stylized fact of predominant equal division.  As Bernheim and Severinov 
(2003) point out, equal division is a “knife edge” outcome; it is difficult to reconcile with 
standard marginal utility based theories.  Bernheim and Severinov (2003) develop a 
theoretical model where children care about parental affection and see bequests as a 
signal of parental preference relative to their siblings.   Altruistic parents care about their 
children and as a result care about their children’s perception of how much they are 
loved.  The model suggests that an equilibrium exists where a large subset of parents will 
divide equally so that children will not believe that their parents are more partial to one 
child than they actually are.   
Empirical research has investigated the prevalence of equal division by looking at 
the determinants of dividing an estate equally.  These studies infer bequest motives from 
differences in the characteristics of parents who chose unequal division as compared to 
those who chose equal division.  Norton and Taylor (2005) link survey responses 
concerning elderly living arrangements and care needs to estate records to investigate 
whether parents who divide unequally are more likely to have living arrangements and 
other characteristics consistent with exchange.   They find little evidence of strategic 
bequests in that living with a child prior to death and elderly care demands do not lead to 
unequal division.  They do find that some factors that could support either altruism or 
exchange do influence unequal division; namely having four or more children and writing   7
a will close to death.  Light and McGarry (2003) find that unequal divisions can be 
explained by some characteristics of mothers consistent with exchange and altruism and 
that mothers’ responses to survey questions concerning why they are not planning on 
dividing their assets equally are evenly divided between altruism and exchange.   
This paper also takes the prevalence of equal division as a point of depart and 
asks why individuals write wills given that estates are divided equally among children in 
the absence of wills.  Currently, in all 50 U.S. states, the intestate succession laws give 
surviving children equal parts of their parents’ estates.
1  Equal division among children is 
also the law under intestacy in many other nations, and was the law in Ireland at the time 
investigated in this paper.  Unequal division among children requires a will, but most will 
writers choose to divide equally in their will.   
  
III. A Simple Model of the Decision to Write a Will  
  In this section, we present a simple model of will writing.  We assume that the 
sole goal of a will is to change the distribution of assets from the distribution that would 
occur under intestacy.   As noted in the previous section, many individuals mimic the 
intestacy distribution in their wills as far as the treatment of children is concerned:  this 
issue along with other potential rationales for will writing will be discussed later. 
 
We assume that a potential testator, i, chooses to write a will if his utility from 
doing so exceeds his utility from dying intestate.   In particular, we assume that an 
individual compares his optimal estate distribution to the distribution that occurs if he 
dies intestate (the laws governing this process are referred to as the laws of intestate 
succession) and writes a will if the utility gain justifies the expense of writing a will. 
Assume an individual has a set of family members or other beneficiaries who 
affect his will writing decision, or who would receive a bequest under intestate 
succession n=1,…N.  Further assume that his entire estate is distributed to these 
individuals and no one else.  We label these bequests  n b . 
                                                 
1 The intestate succession statutes do differ in the treatment of children of deceased children and in the 
portion given to surviving spouses.   8
He has a fixed amount of wealth to distribute at death:  i W .  In other words, he 
does not determine the size of his bequest by weighing it against consumption uses of 
wealth.   He derives some utility from the bequests given to beneficiaries:  () n b b U ,..., 1 .  
This utility may arise because he directly benefits from the utility of other (altruism), 
from services received from heirs as a result of the bequest (exchange), or from the mere 
act of making the bequests (warm glow). 
He incurs a cost of writing a will when he dies.  Assume that this cost has both a 
psychic and financial component.  The psychic cost derives from the need of the 
individual to contemplate his own demise.  The financial cost comes from the need to 
find, hire, and pay a lawyer.  Assume that both the psychic cost, i p , and financial cost, 
i l are individual specific.  The financial cost reduces the amount of assets he is able to 
distribute to his heirs – the resulting estate size is  ii Wl − .  
 
  Intestacy 
If an individual dies intestate, his entire estate is divided amongst his family members 
according to the laws of intestate succession.  The series of bequests dictated by the state 







= ∑ .  His utility under intestate succession is: 
() ,1 , , ,..., | , ii s i s Ni s i i UU b b W X = .   
The vector  i X  includes other state variables such as the endowments of beneficiaries 
prior to bequest, and attributes of the potential testator. 
 
  Testacy 
If an individual writes a will, he chooses bequests to family members to maximize his 
utility subject to the constraint that the total bequests plus the lawyer’s fee for writing the 
will must equal the total bequest.  All bequests are constrained to be positive because an 
individual cannot take assets from one heir at death and transfer it to another.   His   9
optimization problem is:  ()
1, , ,..., 1, , ,
1
,..., , . .
TN T
N
bb T N T ii n Ti i
n
Max U b b p X st b l W
=
+ = ∑  and 
1, 2, , , ,..., 0 TT n T bb b> .   
If we label the optimal bequests that result from solving the optimization problem: 
1 ˆˆ ,... N bb , then the utility of writing a will is: 
() ,1 ˆˆ ,..., | , , , iT N i i i i UU bb W l p X = .  
 If we further assume that the utility function is separable in the psychic costs, we can 
rewrite the utility of writing a will as: 
 
() () ,1 ˆˆ ,..., | , , iT N i i i i UU bb W l X U p =−  
 
  Will Writing 
An individual will choose to write a will if the utility from having a will exceeds the 
utility from dying intestate.  Or, if: 
() () ( ) 11 , , ˆˆ ,..., | , , ,..., | , N i ii i i s N i sii Ub b WlX Up Ub b WX −>        (Equation 1)  
this can be rearranged to 
() () () 11 , , ˆˆ ,..., | , , ,..., | , Ni i i i s N i si i i Ub b WlX Ub b WX Up −>      (Equation 2) 
 
Lemma 1: If there are no costs to will writing, and if individuals indifferent between 
writing a will and not writing a will do write a will, everyone will write a will.   
 
Proof:  In the absence of costs, the exact distribution under intestate succession is 
possible by will.  If the intestate succession outcome is preferred to the testate outcome, 
then the testate outcome could not have been the optimal distribution. 
 
Lemma 2: If bequests did not enter into the utility function i.e., individuals did not care 
about the distribution of their assets, and there were positive psychic costs, no one would 
write a will. 
   10
Proof:  The utilities of the bequests are both equal to zero, so the left hand side of 
Equation 2 equals zero.  This implies that an individual will write a will is the utility of 
the psychic costs is negative, but we’ve constrained the psychic costs to be positive. 
 
The combination of the two Lemmas indicates that the observation that some individuals 
write wills and others do not demonstrates that there are both costs and benefits to will 
writing. 
Even without specifying anything concerning the form of the utility function, we 
can generate a couple of predictions from Equation 2.  Anything that increases the left 
hand side of the equation will increase the likelihood of observing a will as will anything 
that decreases the right hand side.  First, other things equal, individuals with lower 
psychic costs will be more likely to write a will.  Individuals facing lower financial costs 
will also be less likely to write a will because the lower financial costs increase the utility 
of the optimal distribution while leaving the utility of the intestate succession distribution 
unchanged.
2  Second, individuals whose optimal distribution differs most dramatically 
from the intestate succession baseline should be more likely to write wills.  These 
individuals have the most to gain from changing the distribution.  Which individuals are 
most likely to want to change the baseline distribution will depend on the specifics of the 
intestate succession distribution and the utility function determining the optimal 
distribution. 
The effect of wealth on will writing is indeterminate.  For some individuals the 
cost of hiring a lawyer will be prohibitive; as a result, increases in wealth will make will 
writing possible.  Further predictions based on wealth depend on the utility function.   For 
example, if we assume that testators are motivated by altruism, we find that for a broad 
class of individuals, increases in wealth make will-writing less attractive and lead to 
intestacy.  This is the case because as wealth increases, the pre-existing endowments of 
beneficiaries shrink relative to the size of the estate and the distribution under intestate 
succession of dividing wealth equally converges to the altruism distribution of dividing 
the combined assets of all family members equally.  The predictions of the effects of 
wealth according to a specific manifestation of the altruism model are investigated further 
                                                 
2 This holds so long as bequest amounts enter the utility function positively, a very reasonable assumption.   11
in Appendix A.  The strategic bequest theory could lead to a prediction of higher wealth 
leading to a higher probability of writing a will if there are economies of scale in the 
receipt of care services.  An individual would like to give his entire estate to which ever 
child is a better service provider.  The marginal benefit of each dollar given to the 
preferred child and taken away from other children is increasing as wealth increases. 
This discussion is based on the assumption that individuals write wills in order to 
change the distribution of assets.  Other possible motivations for will writing also exist.  
An individual may write a will in order to choose guardians for their minor children, to 
name an executor different from the one appointed by the state, to give bequests to 
charities, to speed the distribution of assets, or to give specific assets to specific 
beneficiaries.  These will be discussed further in light of the findings and once the 
specific legal context of the data is elucidated. 
  
IV. The Context 
While the decision to write a will could be investigated using data from a variety 
of nations and time periods, I choose to look at data from turn of the century County 
Fermanagh, Ireland.  At this time all of Ireland was still subject to English law.   This 
data selection has numerous motivations and advantages.   
First, there was no state old age support system in place in Ireland at this time.  
The first government pension act was passed in 1908.   As a result, older individuals were 
more dependent on younger individuals in their waning years.  Modern research on 
strategic bequests assumes that young individuals provide their elders with phone calls 
and visits.  In the turn of the century Irish context, older individuals relied on the young 
for more basic needs.  As a result, the incentives for strategic interaction were more 
pronounced.  Strategic interactions may be evident in the Irish data, even though they are 
not consistently present in data collected after the advent of government provided old age 
support.   
Second, estate taxes were fairly low so the tax regime in place would have been 
less distortionary than the current tax regime.  Estate taxes were applied in the same 
manner whether a deceased individual wrote a will or died intestate.  Estates below £100 
paid no duty (40% of my sample), estates between £100 and £500 paid 1% of the estate   12
value (45% of the sample). Estates valued above £500 had gradually increasing rates.  
The largest estate in my data, £57148, would have paid 5%.  In addition to estate duties, 
beneficiaries needed to pay Legacy and Succession duties for estates above £1000 (5% of 
the sample), these rates were decreasing in consanguinity.   These rates were also low by 
current standards – 1% for direct lineal relatives.   
Third, Irish testators, like their English and American counterparts, had a great 
deal of freedom over distribution rendering will writing more attractive than in societies 
with less testamentary freedom (such as Italy, France, and Modern Ireland)
3.  While the 
laws of intestate succession provided a default distribution of property upon death, by 
writing a will, testators could choose any alternative distribution of their choosing.   
Testators could be capricious or even cruel if they chose.  The one exception to total 
testamentary freedom was that surviving spouses were entitled to some portion of the 
estate.  In this environment, the will writing decision is more important than in societies 
where only a small portion of the estate can be transferred at the deceased’s discretion.  
Finally, I was able to create a rich data set that contained information on whether 
a set of individuals was testate or intestate as well as information about their family 
circumstances.  For this purpose, I create a data set that combines information on the 
estate of an individual from estate records, matched with information on their living 
arrangements and family status from the Census preceding their death.  I use estate 
records for individuals who died in County Fermanagh, Ireland (now part of Northern 
Ireland) between April 1901 and December 1905 matched with their record in the 1901 
Census, enumerated on March 31, 1901.  
The Irish Census provides a rich array of information on family structure that is 
not available from many other sources.   Other Censuses could presumably be used, but 
in order to match individuals to the Census, we would need access to actual Census 
manuscripts records which are only available for older Censuses.
4  Irish living 
arrangements were complex and diverse during this period providing a good deal of 
variation in the data.  Relatedly, in this period many individuals died without ever having 
married.  I believe that individuals without direct descendents may be the most likely to 
                                                 
3 Many other societies do not allow children to be disinherited by will. 
4 For instance, US census data is only available through 1930.  U.S. Census data is confidential for 72 
years.   13
write a will because they are more likely to find the laws of intestate succession arbitrary 
and desire to change the default distribution.
5  The small size of the Census geographical 
unit, townland, makes it easy to find individuals in the Census, once their townland is 
known from the estate records.  The median townland in the sample has 36 people and 
8.5 families. 
I restrict the analysis to individuals who died in Co. Fermanagh.  I could only 
chose among the counties that are currently part of Northern Ireland because many 
records from the counties in the Republic of Ireland were destroyed by fire.  Among the 
Ulster counties I chose Co. Fermanagh because it is the least populous of the Ulster 
counties which promotes matching, because the county’s Census had been Indexed 
making it possible to find individuals who had changed townland, and because it is a 
fairly average county. The population in Co. Fermanagh in 1901 was approximately 
evenly split between Catholics and Protestants.  It was wealthier than most of the non-
Ulster counties, but poorer than most of the rest of Ulster.  In Appendix B, I compare my 
Co. Fermanagh sample to the entire enumerated Irish population.     
In order to further understand the incentives to write a will, we need additional 
information about the inheritance practices in Ireland at this time.  Farms in Ireland had 
historically been subdivided and by the dawn of the 20
th Century were relatively small 
and most could only realistically support one family.
6  As a result, inheritance practices in 
Ireland in the early 20
th Century were generally characterized by giving the farm to one 
son and expecting the remaining children to live either unmarried with the inheriting son 
or to find a life elsewhere –in the cities of Ireland or abroad.  Daughters could also marry 
the inheriting sons of other families.  Research looking at farm inheritance has not found 
that primogeniture dominated, but rather that the inheriting son would come from across 
the birth order distribution (Kennedy 1991).  Kennedy (1991) hypothesizes that this 
departure from primogeniture arose from the unattractiveness of farm inheritance for 
                                                 
5 Guinnane 1997 contains a lengthy analysis of the reasons for the high level of permanent celibacy.  He 
concludes that changes in the costs and benefits of having a family (for both men and women) can explain 
the high rates of non-marriage.  In particular, expanding life options other than child-rearing and marriage 
allowed individuals to survive without marriage.  He does a good job explaining why simpler explanations 
cannot explain the data.   Other things substituted for the security of marriage and family.   
6 One of the Penal Laws (enacted in 1703) mandated that the land of a Catholic farmer descend in equal 
shares to all his sons.   This restriction lasted until the end of the 18
th Century.   14
some eldest sons who would have to wait too long for their parents to retire or die and 
could find better opportunities outside the family farm.     
  The laws of intestate succession in Ireland also were not characterized by 
primogeniture.  At this time, Ireland was subject to English succession law.
7  English law 
stipulated that in the case of intestacy, real property pass via primogeniture and personal 
property (chattels) pass by more complicated intestate succession arrangements that 
treated all children equally.  In England, some land was freehold and was considered real 
property while other land was leasehold and considered personal property.  By contrast, 
in Ireland by 1901, all landholding whether held as real property or as personal property 
descended to heirs in the manner of personal property i.e. via the intestate succession 
arrangements for chattels.  
 The Irish Land Acts had allowed tenant farmers to purchase the land they worked 
using money borrowed at a low interest rate from the state.   Most of this purchasing had 
occurred between 1885 and 1909, with some of it prior to 1901.  The Registration of Title 
Act of 1891 mandated that all land purchased under the Land Acts where money was 
borrowed from the state be registered.  It further stipulated that all compulsorily 
registered land pass to heirs as personal property.  The justification given for this 
departure from the English treatment of real property was that Irish tenant farmers had 
long been leaseholders and were more familiar and comfortable with equal division of 
land under intestacy and had no experience with issues related to real property 
transmission.
8  
Most of the land holders in my sample were leaseholders or tenant farmers.  Any 
real property held would have been purchased under the Land Acts.  As a result, we can 
                                                 
7 Irish succession law and English succession law were identical with one exception.  In England, bequests 
for the purposes of saying mass for the repose of the soul of the deceased were not permissible because 
they were deemed superstitions, but such bequests were allowed in Ireland.   
8 This justification was pointed out in a debate in the Irish Senate (Seanad Eireann, 1965).  Other possible 
justifications exist.   Primogeniture was beginning to be viewed as an antiquated and unenlightened 
tradition, even in England where it would be abolished in 1925.  Additionally primogeniture was 
particularly problematic in a society with high migration where it could be difficult to find and contact an 
heir.   Alternatively, the state may have been motivated by a desire to enhance its ability to collect the 
substantial debts that accompanied land purchased under the Land Acts.  It is easier to collect debts against 
property that devolves as personal property than against real property.   It is unlikely that this was 
motivated by an English desire to keep farms small as had occurred under the penal laws because these 
arrangements could still be changed by will and because the Land Acts were not punitive, but a 
fundamentally generous solution to the Irish land problem.     15
assume that all assets were divided according to the laws of intestate succession that 
treated all children equally. 
Table 1 details the rules of intestate succession based on who survived the 
deceased.   There are four principal scenarios depending on whether a spouse and/or 
children survived the deceased.  These rules are not random.  They appear to conform to 
some notion of fairness and may attempt to approximate the choices that the deceased 
would have made had he written a will. 
 
V. Data 
The data I gather on estates comes from The Calendar of Probates (essentially an 
index).  Each year has a separate Calendar arranged alphabetically by the last name of the 
deceased.  The Calendar provides information on all estates in Ireland where someone 
was given a grant of Probate or Administration.   When an individual had a will, probate 
was granted to the executor.  Administration was granted to an administrator when an 
individual was intestate or failed to appoint an executor.  The grant of administration or 
probate allowed the grantee to initiate the distribution of assets.  The calendars tells us 
whether an individual was testate or intestate, the total value of his personal property, his 
place of residence, date and place of death, date and place of probate, occupation, and to 
whom probate (for testators) or administration (for the intestate) was granted.  Figure 1A 
provides an example of a record from the Calendar.   
From the Calendars, I collected information on all individuals from Fermanagh 
who died between April 1901 and November 1905 and whose estates received a grant of 
administration or probate between May 1901 and December 1905.  There are 531 
individuals in this data set.  While this does not include all individuals who died, it does 
include all individuals who had estates to pass on after their death and therefore had to 
use legal distribution channels.  A deceased individual would be excluded from the 
sample if he was poor or young (under 18) and did not have any assets or because the   16
deceased was married and female and all her assets automatically transferred to her 
husband.
9  Issues related to sample selection are discussed in greater detail in Section VII.      
Based on the information provided in the Calendars, most importantly the 
deceased’s name and place of residence, I look for the deceased individual and his or her 
family in the 1901 Irish Census for County Fermanagh.  Remarkably, I am able to match 
494 of the 531 individuals to their 1901 Census record, representing a 93% matching rate. 
Three types of data are available from the Census.  First, we know information about the 
individuals in the deceased's household.  In particular, we know how family members are 
related to the household head, and their religion, martial status, literacy, age, occupation, 
and place of birth.
10  An example of a household record is presented in Figure 1B, part b.  
Second, the census provides detailed information on the condition of the family's housing 
including whether the household head is also the landholder.  An example of a building 
record is presented in Figure 1B, part c.  Various housing attributes are reported and 
given points.  The sum of the points, called housepoints¸ is then tabulated.   Housing is 
rated as being first (the best) through fourth class depending on the number of 
housepoints.  We also know whether anyone was seriously ill in the household on the day 
of the census but if so we don’t know who was ill.  Third, we have information on the 
location where the household lived including whether it was a town or a street in a city, 
the town or street population, and the religious distribution of the town or street members.  
Figure 1B, part a, provides an example of the townland information. 
Our analysis is based on these two sets of records only.  We do not use 
information from the wills and administrations themselves, although all of the wills, 
administrations and some additional estate documents are available in the Public Record 
Office of Northern Ireland.
11    The wills do not provide the same information as the 
administrations making it difficult to generate a common set of variables from the two 
                                                 
9 The Married Woman’s Property Act of 1882 allowed woman married after 1882 to control and dispose of 
the property held at the time of marriage.  Most married women who would have been dying in 1901-1905 
were probably married before 1882.     
10 The 1911 Census asks three additional questions of married women -- the number of years the marriage 
has lasted, the number of children born in the marriage and the number still living.  This would provide 
information on family members outside the household.  However, it is less valuable than it first appears 
because the questions are not asked of widows or widowers.  Because the Old Age Pensions Act was 
passed in 1908, 1911 data would not be as useful for this analysis. 
11 In some circumstances, I looked at the estate records to make sure the correct match was being made 
between the estate calendars and Census.   17
sets of records.  In the case of wills, these records contain the wishes of the deceased.  
For administrations they give the information necessary to apply the laws of intestate 
succession.   
I code information from these different sources to create a set of variables that 
allows me to investigate the will writing decision.   Means of the variables coded for the 
entire sample as well as breakdowns based on whether an individual had a will, and the 
legal distribution channel if he had a will, are presented in Table 2.   The sample is 
divided into the entire sample (in columns 2&3), the intestate (in columns 4 & 5), those 
with probated wills (in columns 6 & 7), and those with administrated wills (in columns 8 
& 9).  Individuals with administrated wills are labeled in the Calendars as having “Letters 
of Administration with the Will Annexed.”  In most cases, this indicates that a will was 
written, but that either no executor was appointed or that the appointed executor was 
unable or unwilling to act.   The estate would still go to the beneficiaries named in the 
will and the wife, if living, or next of kin, if the testator was unmarried, would act as the 
administrator.   The majority of the sample had a probated will, while approximately one-
third was intestate.  A small number, seven percent, had administrated wills.
12   The table 
shows that the average time between death and the grant of administration or probate was 
similar for those with probated wills and the intestate indicating that writing a will does 
not appear to speed up the distribution of assets.   
The table presents means of eight sets of variables – estate variables, demographic 
variables, information about potential beneficiaries, measures of literacy, culture, and 
religion, one community measure, wealth variables, occupational indicators, and 
indicators for individuals likely to be influenced by exchange motives.  The format of the 
variable names indicates whether the variable means for the three testation status groups 
are statistically significantly different from one another at the 95% level.    
The theory suggested the need for variables measuring the gap between the 
optimal distribution and the intestate succession distribution, psychic costs of a will, 
financial costs of a will, and wealth.  I describe below how I proxy for each of these 
                                                 
12 We can compare these numbers to some official statistics for Ireland as a whole.  In the District Probate 
courts in 1902, 48% of estates had Probated wills, 10% had administrated wills, and 42% were intestate.  
The percentages in 1903 were nearly identical.  (Judicial Statistics of Ireland, for 1902, 1903; Judicial 
Statistics of Ireland for 1903, 1904)   18
variables.  I also include variables measuring additional attributes of the deceased, his 
estate and his potential beneficiaries to capture other features of the utility function or 
other possible rationales for will-writing.      
Measures of family composition serve to proxy for the gap between the optimal 
distribution and the distribution under intestate succession based on the assumption that 
the intestate succession default less accurately reflects the preferences of individuals in 
certain family types.   I break the deceased into categories based on who will inherit the 
estate under intestacy.
13   This categorization is based on the individuals enumerated in 
the household at the time of the census.
14  In 33% of cases, relatives other than a wife and 
children will inherit, indicating that the deceased was unmarried and childless.  In 14% of 
cases a wife would share the estate with other relatives because the married couple was 
childless.  In an additional 33% of cases, a spouse and children inherit indicating that the 
deceased was married with children.  Finally, in 20% of cases, children inherit alone 
because the deceased was widowed and had children.  I anticipate that individuals whose 
beneficiaries include relatives outside their immediate family should be the most likely to 
write a will because they are more likely to have preferences different from the intestate 
succession default.  For example, the estate of an unmarried childless man without 
parents would be divided equally among his siblings according to the intestate succession 
laws.  I hypothesize that he is likely to desire to write a will to bring about an unequal 
partition among his siblings or to give his estate to other individuals.  By contrast, I 
anticipate that widowers with children will be less likely to write wills, other things 
equal, because the equal division dictated under intestate succession conforms to their 
preferences. 
I include additional measures of the children in the household including an 
indicator as to whether there are any children in the household, the age of the oldest and 
youngest child, the number of children and whether all children or any children are 
minors.  Having minor children may influence the will writing decision because an 
individual may want to appoint a guardian for his children different from the one 
                                                 
13 These categories are based on the rules for men.  The entire estate of a deceased married woman would 
go to her husband.  There are 21 married women in the sample.   
14 Some of the children of older potential testators likely lived outside the household and would not have 
been enumerated in the Census.  However, these categorizations are probably still correct in nearly every 
case because households with children usually had at least one child living within the household.      19
appointed by the state and can do so by will.
15  In modern discussions of will writing, 
guardianship of minor children is frequently advanced as a reason for writing a will. 
Alternatively, there are fewer opportunities for exchange with minor children and the 
earning potential of minor children has not been revealed.  As a result, potential testators 
with minor children have less of an incentive to write a will based on the altruism or 
strategic bequest theories. 
  I use indicators of whether the deceased was able to read and write, or able to read 
but unable to write, and measures of religious confessional group to proxy for the psychic 
costs of will writing.  The majority of the deceased, over 80%, reported to the census 
enumerator that they could read and write.   An additional 9% could read but could not 
write.  The sample is about 40% Catholic and 60% Protestant.  There is little religious or 
educational difference amongst the three testation groups.  I incorporate these measures 
because individuals of different religions or educational attainment may have different 
perspectives, superstitions, or teachings on temporal preparation for death.   In addition, 
religious divisions in Ireland represented cultural divides.  Protestants and Catholics 
attended separate schools and lived in different towns or different areas within cities. In 
my sample, the average deceased Catholic lived in a town that was nearly three quarters 
Catholic while the average Protestant lived in a town that was sixty percent Protestant.    
To measure the financial costs of writing a will, I include a variable indicating 
whether the deceased lived in a city.  I use this as a proxy for the costs of will writing 
based on the assumption that city dwellers had more access to lawyers who could draft 
wills.   Only 17% of the sample lived in a city; half of the city dwellers lived in 
Enniskillen and half lived in smaller cities. The remainder of the sample dwelled in the 
small rural townlands throughout Fermanagh.   Contrary to my prediction that city-
dwellers should be more likely to write wills, I find that a higher percent of the intestate 
lived in cities.  Literacy may also be correlated with the financial cost of writing a will as 
illiterate individuals may need more assistance from lawyers.   
I include a number of measures of wealth.  First, I include the measure of estate 
value provided in the Calendars.   Average log estate value in the sample was ₤4.959 
                                                 
15 More specifically, in a will a married man could appoint a guardian to act jointly with his wife following 
his death.  A married woman could not appoint a guardian for her children as the father would be their sole 
guardian.  A widow could appoint a guardian by will.   20
(£142 -- average estate value was £486).  This is actual reported wealth at death – a far 
more exact measure than is available in other (non-administrative) data sources.  It 
measures the value of all personal property including the value of leasehold properties net 
of rental obligations, but does not include the value of real property and is not net of 
debts or funeral expenses.  Based on richer asset data for a subset of the population, the 
correlation between the reported wealth measure and wealth including real property and 
net of debts and funeral expenses is .6.  Figure 2 displays the wealth distribution 
separately for each sub-sample.   From the graph and table we see that those with 
probated wills were wealthier than individuals in the other groups.  Figure 3 displays the 
wealth distribution separately for the Protestants and Catholics in the sample.  It is well 
known that Protestants throughout Ireland were wealthier than Catholics.   Matching 
religion data from the Census with wealth data from estate records allows me to quantify 
this disparity for a specific population.   
I also measure wealth by include an indicator as to whether there were servants 
enumerated in the household.  In addition, I code a dummy variable based on whether the 
deceased was reported as the landholder in the Census building return.  I also include an 
indictor for when the name of the landholder was left blank.   Most frequently, the 
landholder information is left blank when there was no landholder because the family 
lived in an urban area.  For instance, none of the 39 individuals who lived in Enniskillen 
report a landholder.  I find that individuals with probated wills were more likely than the 
intestate to have servants and hold land. 
I also include a number of occupation measures to proxy for wealth.  My first 
measure places individuals in occupational groups according to the classifications used in 
the published Census Report; professional or commercial, agricultural, domestic or 
industrial, unclear.  I label individuals who were retired or have no reported occupation as 
“unclear.”   Higher fractions of those with probated wills report agricultural and domestic 
or industrial occupations than the intestate.  My second occupational grouping uses more 
standard social class definitions.  I place retired individuals in the category corresponding 
to their former occupations and individuals with no reported occupation in the category 
corresponding to the occupation of the head of household (if related).  While most of the   21
sample in all three testation groups worked as farmers, we also observe that individuals 
with probated wills were more likely to be farmers than the intestate.   
In addition to categorizing occupations, I also map the occupation reported in the 
Census to three different continuous measures of occupation – Haines income score, 
IPUMS status score, and IPUMS income score.  The Haines income score corresponding 
to an occupation is a measure of income imputed from data from the 1901 U.S. Cost of 
Living Survey and compiled in Preston and Haines (1991).  The IPUMS status and 
income scores are measures of the social status and income of an occupations based on 
data in the 1950 Census.  The intestate have higher scores than will writers.  In 
conjunction with these scores, I include separate dummies for those individuals who do 
not report a market occupation (i.e. wife) and for those individuals who report that they 
are independently wealthy and therefore do not need to work.   
 I also include a standard set of demographic variables – age, sex, and marital 
status.  From the demographic variables we observe that the average age at death was 
65.
16  Those with wills, either probated or administrated, were older than the intestate.   
Figure 4 graphs the distribution of age at death for the three testation groups.  Figure 5 
displays the frequency of different ages reported in the census for the entire deceased 
population.  We see obvious signs of the age-heaping common in the self-reported age 
data from less advanced societies.
17  While age was not incorporated directly into the 
model, we may anticipate that age would influence will writing for a couple reasons.  
First, wills are valid unless subsequently revoked, usually by a newer will, so an 
individual will have a will if one was ever written.   Older individuals have had more 
time to write a will.   Second, a will is not needed until a person dies, so individuals may 
become more likely to write a will as they age and anticipate that they will die soon.   
Over three-quarters of the sample are male.  This is partly due to the near 
exclusion of married women from the sample.  However, even among the never married, 
men outnumber women 3 to 1.  Most never married women probably had few assets and 
                                                 
16 Age at death is age reported in the Census plus the amount of time between the date of death as reported 
in the Calendars and the Census date of March 31, 1901. 
17 Most tests for age heaping find that heaping is more common at older ages.  Given that so many of the 
individuals in the deceased sample were old at the time of the census, the high degree of age heaping in the 
data is not surprising.  Within the sample, I find reporting of an age ending in a 0 or 5 to increase in age, 
decreasing in wealth, and higher for the illiterate.   22
were dependent on parents or siblings.   The intestate were more likely to be never 
married and less likely to be widowed than those with probated wills; this may be an age 
effect.  In keeping with the famous Irish low marriage rates, we see that 28.5% of the 
deceased were never married.  By comparison, according to recent U.S. statistics, 10.4% 
of individuals who died in 2003 and were over 15 were never married.  (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services 2006) Individuals with administrated wills more likely to 
be married than those with probated wills and the intestate (the difference with the 
intestate is statistically significant at the 10% level). 
Finally, I include three family structure variables that will help with an 
assessment of the exchange model.  With these, I hope to label individuals who were 
dependent on others during old age and would potentially need to pay for this care in the 
form of a disproportionate bequest.  In order to single out the relative who provided care, 
a will is needed.  As was the case with the earlier beneficiary indicators, I hypothesize 
these individuals have the most to gain from changing the default distribution.   First, I 
include an indicator as to whether the deceased appeared to live as a dependent on a 
grown child.  This includes individuals who are labeled in the Census as the mother or 
father of the head, and those who live with one son or daughter who is 30 or above.  I 
view this as an indicator of exchange because individuals living with one prime age child 
are likely to be getting care-giving services from that child.  I find that this type of living 
arrangement is most common among those with probated wills.  Second, I include a 
variable measuring whether an individual is not related to the head in a direct lineal 
manner.  This includes individuals who are brothers, sisters, cousins, aunts or uncles of 
the family head.   I assume that these individuals were supported by the household head 
and are more indebted to him than to other similarly related individuals.  Third, I include 
an indicator for whether an individual is reported as being retired either in the Census or 
in the estate record or reported an occupation that provides no income -- such as 
housekeeper or wife.  I believe that individuals without a source of income are more 
likely to be dependent on their children or others in old age and therefore need to 
compensate those who provided support.
18   
                                                 
18 I exclude individuals retired from the armed forces or police in this definition of the retired because they 
would have received pensions.   23
From Table 2 we get a picture of individuals with Administrated wills as being 
older, married, relatively poor landowners.  This pattern leads to the conjecture that for 
such estates the appointed executor may believe that the widow will do an adequate job 
administering a small farming estate and may step aside as a result.  Alternately, the 
deceased may not have appointed an executor at all deeming his wife equal to the task.   
In either case, the motivations of the deceased in writing a will are not different from the 
motivations of those with a probated will.  As a result, for the remainder of the paper, I 
am going to group individuals with administrated wills and individuals with probated 
wills together.  All of these individuals went to the expense and trouble of writing a will.   
 
VI. Estimation and Findings 
  To investigate the determinants of having a will, I estimate a probit model where 
the dependent variable is equal to one if the individual has a will (either probated or 
administrated) and equal to zero if the individual died intestate.  I report marginal effects 
in the Tables below.  The coefficients can be interpreted as telling us how a marginal 
change in the underlying independent variable influences the probability of having a will.   
Because of the numerous different variables available in the data set, I am going 
to begin with the demographic variables and progressively add other variable groups.  In 
column 1 of Table 3, I report the determinants of will writing based on age, sex, and 
marital status.  I find that among these variables only age has a statistically significant 
effect on the probability of writing a will.  A one year change in age changes the 
probability of having a will by one percent.   Calculated differently, a one standard 
deviation change in age, 15 years, changes the probability of having a will by about 15%.   
This relationship between will writing and age is consistent with the fact that older 
individuals are more likely to die and a will is unnecessary prior to death.  Younger 
individuals may have put off will writing because they were not expecting to die.  If we 
were able to obtain individual cause of death data we could further investigate whether 
individuals without wills were more likely to die from accidents and fast moving illnesses 
and were not anticipating their deaths.  Unfortunately, this data is unobtainable.
19  
                                                 
19 The registrar of deaths in Belfast does have the data available, but it is expensive to procure and would 
need to be done by a civil servant separately for each individual.    24
Interestingly, overall data on cause of death show that illness far exceeds accidents and 
other unexpected events as the major cause of death.  If we look at the readily available 
U.S. mortality statistics for this period, we find approximately 5% of deaths caused by 
accidents.   Comparable statistics for England and Wales yield a lower number – close to 
1%.   At this time the leading causes of death in England and Wales and the U.S. were 
Tuberculosis and Influenza/Pneumonia -- illnesses that don’t kill or total incapacitate an 
individual instantaneously presumably leaving an ill person time to write a will if desired.   
In column 2, I replace the marital status variable with the beneficiary variables 
that indicate who will inherit the estate if the individual dies intestate.   As mentioned 
earlier, I expect that individuals will be more likely to write a will if other relatives 
inherit either exclusively or in conjunction with the deceased’s wife because in these 
cases, potential testators are more likely to find the division dictated by intestate 
succession arbitrary.  This prediction is not supported in the data.  The marginal effects 
on these two types of families relative to those where a wife and children inherit are 
negative and statistically insignificant; if anything individuals with estates divided 
outside their immediate families are more likely to be intestate.
20 This result could arise if 
individuals in these types of families are less concerned about what happens to their 
assets because they care less about those they leave behind. 
In column 3, I incorporate measures of literacy and religion.   None of these 
variables is statistically significant indicating that these proxies for psychic costs do not 
appear to affect will writing.  Alternatively religion and literacy may be poor proxies for 
psychic costs.  One issue with this regression is that we are omitting wealth which is 
highly correlated with religion.  
In column 4, I add a dummy indicating whether the deceased lived in a city.  I 
find that city dwellers are 15% less likely to write wills, contrary to my predictions.  This 
is not a wealth effect because city dwellers were on average wealthier than non-city 
residents.  However, it may be a result of the low landholding by individuals in cities.  
Only 5% of city dwellers report that they are the landholder on their Census forms as 
                                                 
20 These results are unchanged if we create a separate category for married women whose entire estate 
would go to her husband under intestate succession.   25
opposed to 72% of individuals outside of cities.  This will be revisited in greater detail 
below. 
The final column of Table 3 adds a variable measuring the natural log of the 
estate value to the regression.  I find that a one percent increase in wealth increased the 
probability of having a will by seven percent.  While the effect of wealth on will writing 
was indeterminate based on the theory, intuitively individuals with more to distribute 
may be expected to go to more trouble to distribute.  This result does not appear to be 
driven by their being a threshold below which no one writes a will.  Fifty percent of 
individuals in the bottom wealth decile have a will and the probability of having a will is 
increasing in wealth for individuals above the bottom decline.  In this final column, the 
effect of living in a city becomes larger.  This indicates that the earlier result was muted 
by the absence of wealth.  
I further investigate these results by maintaining a subset of variables and adding 
alternative measures of family structure in Table 4.  I look at whether having children, 
their ages, or whether any or all are minors affects will writing. None of these measures 
of family structure is statistically significant.  Similar to the measures of beneficiaries, 
characteristics of children do not influence will writing.  
In Table 5, we incorporate an additional set of wealth and income measures.   In 
column 2, we add in two measures of wealth traditionally used in the economic history 
literature – whether the household contains servants and the number of housepoints 
(similar to the common measure of the number of windows).  Neither is statistically 
significant, although the coefficient on servants is positive and large.   Both of these are 
highly correlated with wealth, which is already controlled in the regression.  In column 4 
we add information about landholding in the form of indicators for whether the deceased 
is the holder of the land where he lives, and an indicator for whether the landholder 
information is blank.  Relative to individuals who live on the holdings of others, 
landholders are 9% more likely to write wills.   Because the value of most land (the value 
of real property is excluded) is incorporated into the measure of wealth, this result 
indicates that the type of wealth influences will-writing.   We may find this higher 
propensity to write a will among landholders because the assets of non-landowners may 
have been more liquid and easier to split among beneficiaries.   Landholders may have   26
had more concern with giving a single beneficiary a sizeable enough farm to support a 
family and may have been concerned with which child inherited the holding.   
In columns (5)-(9) we add the various measures related to the occupation of the 
deceased as detailed in the previous section.  None of the occupational grouping or scores 
has any predictive power of the probability of writing a will controlling for wealth.   
In Table 6, I incorporate the indicators for households where I expect individuals 
to be influenced by exchange.  In column 2, I add the dummy indicating whether an 
individual lived with one prime aged child prior to death.    In column 3, I add the 
indicator for individuals who were enumerated outside their family of origin.  In column 
4, I incorporate the indicator for individuals with no obvious income source based on the 
occupation reported to the Census or in the Calendars.   For the first and the last 
indicators of exchange, the point estimates are large and positive and the effect on will 
writing of having no obvious source of income is statistically significant.  This finding is 
consistent with those more dependent on others in their last years being motivated by 
exchange in deciding to distribute their assets after death.  I do not find that living outside 
ones family of origin influences the probability of having a will.  The point estimate here 
is negative in keeping with the finding that individuals whose estates devolve to 
individuals outside their immediate family appear to be less likely to write wills. 
To investigate these results further, I look at the determinants of will writing for 
six separate sub-population groups: men and women, Protestants and Catholics, and land 
holders and non-land owners.  I do this separately for each measure of exchange and 
present the results of separate regressions for each group in Tables 7-9.   
A number of noteworthy patterns emerge from these tables.  First, we observe in 
Table 8 that the point estimate of the effect of living outside of ones family of origin on 
will writing is negative for all groups and statistically insignificant.  Most of these 
individuals live with siblings.  We find no evidence that these individuals write a will to 
compensate their sibling for giving them a place to live.  The negative relationship we 
find could be consistent with altruism if these individual place a low weight on the utility 
of others generally and as a result do not care about who receives their assets.   When we 
look at the other two measures of exchange, we find that these exchange motivations are 
stronger for women and non-land owners than their counterparts. Women living with a   27
prime age child are 28% more likely to write a will than other women while women with 
no obvious income sources are (statistically insignificantly) 15% more likely to write a 
will.  Among non-landholders and those where the name of the landholder is not given, 
those living with a prime aged child are 31% more likely to write a will and those with no 
income source are 21% more likely to write a will.   
Women and non-landholders were disadvantaged relative to others (as were 
Catholics) and as a result more likely to be dependent on others for support during old 
age, so it is reassuring that they appear to be more motivated by exchange.  Landholders 
were unlikely to be dependent in old age because their holding provided enough food and 
income to support them.  Even if a landholder was too old to work the land, he could 
guarantee some minimum level of sustenance. 
I also find that the role of landholding in leading to will writing was concentrated 
among Protestants and men.  The value of the land owned by these two advantaged 
population groups, even controlling for wealth, was probably higher.  These groups may 
also have owned real property not counted in our wealth measure.  Finally, the influence 
of age on will writing was positive and statistically significant for all of the groups.  I find 
a curious result that women who could read, but could not write were much more likely 
to have wills.
 21  
 
 
One potential explanation for the differences between men and women is that they 
were differentially selected into the sample.  In the next section, we investigate sample 
selection and its potential influence on these findings.     
 
VII. Sample Selection 
Our sample consists of all individuals who died between April 1901 and 
November 1905 in County Fermanagh and whose estates received a grant of 
administration or probate between May 1901 and December 1905 and who we were able 
to find in the 1901 Census. 
                                                 
21 I looked at the determinants of literacy and found that wealthier individuals, younger individuals, and 
Protestants were more likely to be literate.  This indicates that this variable is correctly specified.   28
  As a result, the sample is selected from the population of individuals who died in 
Fermanagh between March 1901 and 1905 in two manners.  First, there are individuals 
who we are unable to find in the 1901 Census and second there are those who died 
between the target dates who did not have their estates go through administration or 
probate prior to December 31, 1905 either because their estates did not go through 
administration or probate at all or because the legal process occurred after the end of 
1905.  We discuss each of these sources of selection in turn. 
  Our first issue is that we are unable to find some individuals in the 1901 Census.  
As mentioned earlier, I am able to match over 90% of those individuals in the Calendars.   
This is an impressive match rate.    The principal way that we are able to match 
individuals is through townland and name.  Townlands are very small.  The median 
townland of the deceased had only 9 families.   In some cases there is not an exact and 
unique match between the townland and name in the Calendar and the same information 
in the Census.  I address this problem in a myriad of ways. 
In a number of cases there is more than one individual in the townland with the 
same name as the deceased.  Often most individuals in a townland have the same 
surname – probably the result of farm division by common ancestors.   First names are 
also fairly well concentrated – among the deceased in my sample nearly 30% were named 
James, John, Patrick, Thomas, or William.  In many of the cases where more than one 
person has the same name, I am able to find the deceased based on ancillary information 
provided in the calendars – such as occupation or the name of and relationship to the 
person who was granted probate or administration.   Also, sometimes I am unable to find 
the deceased in the Census, but can clearly find the deceased’s family in the Census.  In 
these cases, I use the information on the remainder of the family members – these 
individuals are included among the matched. 
22  If I cannot find the deceased or his 
family in the given townland, the availability of an index allows me to look for 
individuals with that name in other townlands.  I occasionally will find the deceased in a 
townland adjacent to the one reported in the Calendar.  Given the small and rural nature 
of most townlands, the boundaries were probably pretty uncertain. 
                                                 
22 In 51 cases there is more than one individual with the same name in the townland.  In seven cases, I can 
find the deceased’s family, but the deceased is absent.    29
Of the 531 individuals from the calendars, 38 cannot be found in the 1901 Census 
Microfilm using any of these techniques.  Among those that we are unable to match, we 
can think of a couple possible reasons why we cannot find them in the census.  We would 
be unable to match someone if they had changed their name or recorded it drastically 
differently in the two records, if they had been absent on the Census date, or if they 
moved between the Census and their death, especially if they had previously lived outside 
Fermanagh.   
Looking more closely at the unmatched sample, the principal phenomenon that 
seems to be at work is that some people must have moved to the location reported in the 
index after the Census, or been otherwise absent on the Census date.  We are often able to 
find the townland listed by an individual, but not find a record of them or their family 
within the townland.  This may be due to occupation such as an itinerant priest or a 
roving reporter (occupations among the unmatched) or to a family move. The fact that we 
are able to match such a high percentage speaks to the generally low mobility of the 
population within Ireland – according to the Census 86 percent of individuals enumerated 
in the whole of Ireland lived in the county where they were born on the Census date.
23    
The lack of a perfect match brings up the question of potential selection bias.  We 
need to be concerned if those individuals that we are not able to match are somehow 
systematically different in a manner relevant to their estate distribution decisions.  Given 
the high match rate, selection is unlikely to be a major issue, nonetheless it is a concern.   
To look more systematically at sample selection, I predict the probability of being 
matched in the Census based on the information available in the Calendars.  Fortunately, 
the Calendars are a rich data source.  I include information on gender, occupation, estate 
value, whether the deceased was intestate or not, whether estate administration occurred 
in Dublin or Armagh, whether the individual lived in the city of Enniskillen, and the 
amount of time between the Census and the individual’s death.  Nearly all women 
included in the sample are labeled as Widows or Spinsters in the Calendars.  While 
according to the Census definitions, spinsters are involved in an industrial occupation, in 
the context of the Calendars this appears to designate a never married woman.    As a 
                                                 
23 Ireland is know for its high out migration rates, but these individuals would have died outside of Ireland 
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result, we include a spinster indicator in the regression and do not include spinster as an 
industrial occupation.   
Marginal effects from a Probit model predicting matching are presented in Table 
10.  We present the results for the total population in Column 1 and then separately for 
males and females in Columns 2 and 3. The occupational categories are based on the 
Census occupational definitions; results using occupations based on social status yield a 
consistent result.  For the entire population, the only attribute that predicts matching is 
occupation.  Farmers are 15 percent more likely to be matched than managers and 
professionals (the omitted category).  Given that farmers are tied to the land, and that the 
Census date of March 31 is at the start of the planting season, it is not surprising that they 
are easy to find.   I also find that those with industrial occupations are easier to match.  
This may demonstrate increased geographic mobility among managers and professionals 
(the omitted occupational category).  
When we look separately by sex, we find that no attributes predict matching 
among women while occupation, residence in Enniskillen, and having a will probated in 
Dublin predict matching among men.  The marginal effect for farmers is far larger than 
the other estimates.  Residence in Enniskillen may influence the results because Census 
enumeration had better coverage in an urban area or because individuals in Enniskillen 
were more likely to reside in the same town according to the Calendars and the Census.  
We are 4% more likely to match individuals with estates probated or administrated in 
Dublin than individuals probated or administrated in Armagh.  The registry in Dublin was 
the principal registry while the Armagh registry was the district registry covering 
Fermanagh and nearby counties.  There was no administrative or geographic reason to 
prefer one registry over another, but the Dublin registry may have been more prestigious 
and may have attracted more established families who would also have been easier to 
find in the Census.     
The variable measuring having a will is not significantly different from zero and 
the point estimate is small.  We also estimate the probability of having a will based on the 
variables observed in the Calendars including an indicator of whether the individual was 
matched to the Census.  Being matched to the Census has a small and statistically 
insignificant effect on will writing.  Combined, these results indicate that selection into   31
the matched sample is unlikely to influence the results.  As a result, we do not adjust the 
sample for selection. 
  While we have a great deal of information concerning those individuals who we 
are unable to match to the Census, we have very little information concerning individuals 
whose died, but who did not have estates go through administration or probate.  The 
principal reason to be excluded from these legal channels would be the absence of any 
possessions of value upon death.  In general, in order for administration or probate to 
occur someone would need to initiate the process for the transmission of assets and desire 
the assets of the deceased.  Individuals who possessed nothing of value would not have 
their death lead to estate distribution.  Some of these individuals would have passed their 
possessions to their heirs via intervivos transmission, and others would have had nothing 
to begin with.  Therefore, our results characterize the will writing decision among 
individuals with assets at death.   Presumably individuals without assets would not have 
wills because they have nothing to gain from changing the distribution of their minimal 
estates.  Moreover, the cost of writing a will may exceed their assets.  
The total lack of assets would particularly characterize two groups among the 
deceased -- dependent children and married women.  Dependent children would not have 
accumulated any possessions – the property of children under 21 was in practice the 
property of their parents.   The property rights and holdings of married women were also 
very limited.  The personal property held by women who were married in1882 or earlier 
was the “absolute property of the husband” with some minor exceptions. (British 
Almanac, 1901)  Women married after 1883 could more easily own property independent 
of their husbands, but this was limited in practice except for among women in the upper 
reaches of society.   
   In order to get a better picture of the potential nature of selection into the Probate 
and Administration processes from the overall deceased population, we perform some 
simple calculations based on vital statistics data.  (Mitchell 1962) We use death rates by 
age group and gender for all of Ireland, to generate approximations of deaths by age 
group and year in Femanagh.  We then compare these numbers to our sample. 
The county of Fermanagh contained 65,430 people according to the 1901 census.  
If we assume that the population was divided by age group and gender in the same   32
manner as was Ireland as a whole, we arrive at the population by gender by age category 
estimates presented in the first column of Table 11 for men and Table 12 for women.  If 
we further assume that the annual death rate, by age group and gender were the same at 
those prevailing in Ireland in 1900-1902, we can generate estimates of the number of 
people who would have died, by age group and gender, per year.  Those estimates are 
presented in the third column of Table 11 and Table 12.    
Our sample covers people who died between April 5, 1901 and Nov 13, 1905.  
Because of the timing of the census, we do not have people for all of 1901.  Because 
some people have their estates probated quite a while after their deaths, and we only look 
at the calendars through the end of 1905, we do not have many people who died in 1905.  
As a result, we have three full years of data 1902-1904.  We probably have a nearly 
complete sample of individuals who died between 1902 and 1904 because approximately 
85% of estates are probated within a year of death indicating we would have observed in 
the calendars through the end of 1905 nearly everyone who died through the end of 
1904.
24  Assuming that we have three years of data, the total deaths would be about three 
times the annual death rates, again presented in Tables 11 and 12, column 4.  Across both 
genders, this leads to a countywide three year death total of 3582 people 
  For deaths between 1902 and 1904, we have a matched deceased sample of 372 
individuals.  This indicates that we are capturing about 10% of individuals who died.  
This 10% is not evenly split across age and gender groupings.  We present the percent of 
deceased people captured in our sample by age and gender in column 5 of the two tables.  
These representation rates are graphed by age group and gender in Figure 6.  This 
indicates that we are capturing 6% of women aged 25 and over and 24% of men.   The 
pattern of these rates is consistent with the earlier discussion with no children represented 
and low representation of women.  The representation of men is also fairly low indicating 
that property ownership at death was far from universal, even among prime aged males.   
  We could potentially adjust for selection by weighting individuals in a manner 
inversely proportional to their representation in our sample.  In that way, we could 
generate a sample that represented the entire deceased population.  However, doing so 
                                                 
24 According to the Almanac, executors were liable for penalties if probate was not taken out within six 
months of the testator’s death.   33
would not be accurate because individuals are not randomly selected from their age and 
sex categories, but rather are selected based on their asset value and we have no 
information on the asset value of individuals who died but did not have estates (aside 
from a general assumption that it is low).  Rather than trying to correct for this issue, we 
conclude that our sample represents all deceased individuals with assets rather than all 
deceased individuals. 
  The third source of selection involves the absence of individuals who died prior to 
December 1905, who had their estates go through probate or administration, but after 
December 1905.  In other words, we are missing some individuals who have a lengthy 
delay between death and probate.  The date of probate or administration would depend on 
the executors or administrators submitting the necessary paperwork to the probate 
registry and the registry being satisfied enough with the information provided to grant 
probate or administration.   We can get some idea of why some individuals might be 
excluded from the sample by looking at the determinants of the timing between death and 
probate within our sample.   
  In Table 13 we present results from regressions predicting the number of days 
between probate and death.  In the first column, we include basic information about the 
deceased, in the second column we add information about beneficiaries, and in the third 
column we add more detailed information about the number of sons of the deceased.  Our 
discussion of the results focuses on the final column of the table.  We find that probate is 
faster for wealthier individuals.  This result is consistent with the time value of money, 
with beneficiaries more eager to get their hands on larger estates.  We also find that 
controlling for wealth, land ownership delays the issuing of a grant.  Land transmission 
likely required more extensive paperwork and valuation.  Finally, we find that the 
number of sons increases the time until probate.  In particular, families with two sons 
received a grant over two months later than families with only one son (the omitted 
category).   If we look further, we find that this effect is strongest for estates without 
wills.  The results indicate that estates with multiple sons may be more contentious and it 
may take the sons, who both lived with their parent on the Census date, more time to 
generate the consensus needed to apply for probate.  Alternately, households with sons at   34
home may be less eager to divide the assets and may be more able to continue to function 
without estate division.   
  We can partly compensate for the lack of observations with lengthy delays 
between death and probate, by re-weighting the sample, and giving more weight to those 
with longer days between death and grant issuance.  Doing so does not change any of the 
substantive results.    
 
VII. Implications 
  We find that the main determinants of having a will at death are age at death and 
wealth.  The result that age influences will writing corresponds to the notion that an 
individual does not need a will until after he is dead.   As a result, individuals who think 
that they are going to die in the near future, such as the old, are more likely to have a will.   
The effect of wealth on will writing is indeterminate (or negative under reasonable 
assumptions) according to the altruism model, but the strong positive effects we find 
correspond to other theories.  For example, we would generate this result if individuals 
get no utility from assets distributed by intestate succession, but some benefit from assets 
distributed deliberately by will.  Wealthier individuals may also have more specific items 
that they would like to distribute to certain beneficiaries (e.g. I give my daughter Molly 
my china).  We also see some indication that the type of assets held by an individual 
influences will writing.   In particular, landholding increases the probability of writing a 
will for men and Protestants.  
We also find some evidence of exchange motives for women and non-land 
owners.   In particular, we find that women and non-land owners who live with a prime 
aged child or who do not report an income generating occupation are more likely to write 
a will.   This supports exchange because these individuals would have been dependent on 
others for financial support during their waning years and would need a will to 
compensate these others for the support given and services provided. 
We find little support for a more sophisticated model where an individual 
compares his utility under testacy and intestate succession and optimizes.  This model 
leads to the prediction than beneficiaries and living arrangement should matter.  This 
prediction is not supported in the data.   The beneficiary characteristics that we are able to   35
glean from the Census manuscripts have no effect on will writing.  Instead it is the 
characteristics of the dying himself and his assets that influence the decision to write a 
will.    
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Table 1: Intestate Succession Laws, Ireland 1901 
Personal Property (Chattels) 
•  Married Woman: All to husband 
•  Widow and Kids: First £500 and ½ of remainder to wife, ½ of remainder split 
among kids  
•  Kids Only: Evenly distributed among them 
•  Widow No Kids: First £500 and half of remainder to wife, ½ as under no widow 
or kids  
•  No Widow or Kids: All to father; no Father to mother and siblings evenly 
•  No Next of Kin: To state 
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Table 2: Variable Means by Testation Status 




Administration With Will 0.073 0.260
Days Death to Probate/Administration 181.488 207.309 174.417 227.919 179.824 198.463 227.889 172.610
Beneficiary Info
Other Relatives Inherit 0.334 0.472 0.387 0.488 0.317 0.466 0.194 0.401
Wife and Other Relatives Inherit 0.136 0.343 0.167 0.374 0.114 0.318 0.167 0.378
Wife and Children Inherit 0.332 0.471 0.298 0.459 0.334 0.473 0.472 0.506
Children Inherit 0.198 0.399 0.149 0.357 0.234 0.424 0.167 0.378
Age of Youngest Child 22.633 12.613 17.891 11.542 24.849 12.734 23.261 11.845
Age of Oldest Child 28.251 11.330 23.981 10.606 30.210 11.200 28.913 11.441
Has Any Children 0.522 0.500 0.440 0.498 0.559 0.497 0.639 0.487
All Children 16 or Under 0.077 0.267 0.089 0.286 0.069 0.254 0.083 0.280
Has a Child 16 or Under 0.170 0.376 0.202 0.403 0.155 0.363 0.139 0.351
Number of Children 1.322 1.743 1.190 1.699 1.383 1.804 1.472 1.404
Literacy/Culture/Religion
Roman Catholic 0.423 0.495 0.452 0.499 0.403 0.491 0.444 0.504
Protestant Episcopalian 0.415 0.493 0.393 0.490 0.431 0.496 0.389 0.494
Other Protestant 0.162 0.369 0.155 0.363 0.166 0.372 0.167 0.378
Can Read and Write 0.818 0.386 0.857 0.351 0.803 0.398 0.750 0.439
Can Read but Cannot Write  0.093 0.291 0.071 0.258 0.103 0.305 0.111 0.319
Community
Deceased Lived in a City 0.168 0.374 0.238 0.427 0.131 0.338 0.139 0.351
Wealth
Natural Log of Estate Value 4.959 1.304 4.700 1.283 5.153 1.268 4.599 1.432
Household Contains Servants 0.348 0.477 0.292 0.456 0.397 0.490 0.222 0.422
Census Housepoints 7.831 4.497 7.527 3.363 8.024 5.148 7.667 3.260
Lives on Own Holding 0.609 0.489 0.485 0.501 0.666 0.473 0.722 0.454
Landholder Blank 0.162 0.369 0.216 0.412 0.128 0.334 0.194 0.401
Does Not Live on Own Holding 0.229 0.421 0.299 0.459 0.207 0.406 0.083 0.280
Variable name in italics if those with probated will significantly different from the intestate at 95% level
Variable name in bold if those with administrated will significantly different from the intestate at 95% level
Variable name double underlined if probated will significantly different from administrated will at 95% level
Whole Sample Administrated Will Intestate Probated Will  40
Table 2: Variable Means by Testation Status, Continued 
Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  Std. Dev.
Occupation and Occupation Scores
Census Professional or Commercial Worker 0.047 0.211 0.054 0.226 0.041 0.200 0.056 0.232
Census Agricultural Worker 0.650 0.478 0.577 0.495 0.693 0.462 0.639 0.487
Census Domestic or Industrial Worker 0.107 0.310 0.173 0.379 0.066 0.248 0.139 0.351
Census Class of Worker Unclear 0.196 0.398 0.196 0.398 0.200 0.401 0.167 0.378
Class Professional / Shopkeeper 0.162 0.369 0.196 0.398 0.155 0.363 0.083 0.280
Class Farmer 0.717 0.451 0.655 0.477 0.752 0.433 0.722 0.454
Class Skilled Craft 0.057 0.231 0.071 0.258 0.041 0.200 0.111 0.319
Class Unskilled 0.030 0.172 0.048 0.214 0.024 0.154 0.000 0.000
Class Unknown 0.034 0.182 0.030 0.170 0.028 0.164 0.083 0.280
Haines Income Score /100 3.674 2.419 3.988 2.827 3.506 2.186 3.578 2.052
IPUMS Occupation Status Score 21.772 54.147 28.781 78.740 18.557 37.061 15.153 10.102
IPUMS Occupation Income Score 14.667 9.364 15.560 10.596 14.219 8.805 14.139 7.353
No Market Occupation Given for Scores 0.099 0.299 0.090 0.287 0.100 0.301 0.139 0.351
Indepenent Wealth for Scores 0.024 0.154 0.030 0.171 0.024 0.154 0.000 0.000
Demographics
Age at Death 64.714 15.170 58.276 15.128 68.219 14.239 66.516 13.090
Male 0.777 0.416 0.768 0.423 0.783 0.413 0.778 0.422
Never Married 0.283 0.451 0.351 0.479 0.255 0.437 0.194 0.401
Married  0.468 0.499 0.464 0.500 0.448 0.498 0.639 0.487
Widowed 0.249 0.433 0.185 0.389 0.297 0.458 0.167 0.378
Exchange Indicators
Deceased is Parent of Head or Head/Wife 
with Prime Aged Child 0.097 0.296 0.042 0.200 0.134 0.342 0.056 0.232
Deceased Lives Outside Family of Origin 0.063 0.243 0.095 0.294 0.052 0.222 0.000 0.000
No Obvious Income Source 0.156 0.363 0.131 0.338 0.166 0.372 0.194 0.401
Sample Size 494 168 290 36
Variable name in italics if those with probated will significantly different from the intestate at 95% level
Variable name in bold if those with administrated will significantly different from the intestate at 95% level
Variable name double underlined if probated will significantly different from administrated will at 95% level
Whole Sample Intestate Probated Will Administrated Will
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Table 3: Determinants of Will Writing 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Demographics Beneficiaries
Literacy / Culture / 
Religion Environment Wealth
Age at Death 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Male 0.032 0.019 0.025 0.001 -0.024
(0.056) (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Dummy=1 if Married -0.026
(0.060)
Dummy=1 if Never Married -0.047
(0.066)
Children Inherit -0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.020
(0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069)
Other Relatives Inherit -0.046 -0.050 -0.053 -0.052
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
Wife and Other Relatives Inherit -0.106 -0.105 -0.093 -0.086
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Other Protestant 0.040 0.047 0.011
(0.064) (0.063) (0.067)
Protestant Episcopalian 0.027 0.026 -0.010
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write -0.067 -0.055 -0.095
(0.077) (0.078) (0.076)
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write 0.049 0.053 0.052
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City -0.148** -0.211***
(0.063) (0.066)
Log of Estate Value 0.074***
(0.019)
Observations 494 494 494 494 493
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    42
 
Table 4: Characteristics of Children 











Age at Death 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write -0.092 -0.122 -0.095 -0.092 -0.100 -0.095
(0.075) (0.093) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075)
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write 0.055 -0.050 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.054
(0.100) (0.160) (0.100) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100)
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City -0.210*** -0.235** -0.208*** -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.207***
(0.064) (0.093) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.064)
Log of Estate Value 0.073*** 0.080*** 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Age of Youngest Child 0.005
(0.005)
Age of Oldest Child -0.004
(0.006)
Has Any Children 0.052
(0.045)
All Children 16 and Under 0.107
(0.072)
Has a Child 16 or Under -0.001
(0.059)
Number of Children 0.010
(0.013)
Observations 493 259 493 493 493 493
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    43
 
Table 5: Indicators of Wealth and Income 
 























Age at Death 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write -0.092 -0.098 -0.100 -0.106 -0.101 -0.102 -0.098 -0.098
(0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074)
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write 0.055 0.060 0.054 0.047 0.054 0.048 0.050 0.050
(0.100) (0.099) (0.100) (0.102) (0.100) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101)
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City -0.210*** -0.217*** -0.192* -0.185 -0.210* -0.197 -0.166 -0.168
(0.064) (0.067) (0.112) (0.119) (0.123) (0.122) (0.113) (0.120)
Log of Estate Value 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.058***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Dummy=1 if Household contains Servants 0.065 0.068 0.067 0.074 0.064 0.064 0.065
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Census Housepoints 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder 0.092 0.101 0.108* 0.117** 0.107* 0.112*
(0.056) (0.065) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank 0.047 0.066 0.034 0.059 0.056 0.059
(0.099) (0.099) (0.103) (0.099) (0.099) (0.098)
No Market Occupation Given 0.115 0.071 0.073
(0.087) (0.075) (0.097)
Occupation -- Independent Wealth -0.051 -0.127 -0.120
(0.179) (0.163) (0.189)
Haines Income Score/100 -0.005
(0.014)
Occupation Status Score -0.001
(0.001)
Occupation Income Score 0.001
(0.004)    44
 
Table 5: Indicators of Wealth and Income, Continued 
 



































Class Worker Unclear (e.g. Wife) 0.010
(0.118)
Domestic or Industrial Worker -0.120
(0.134)
Observations 493 489 489 489 489 488 488 488
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  45
Table 6: Indicators of Exchange 













Age at Death 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write -0.090 -0.087 -0.085 -0.102
(0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.075)
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write 0.049 0.047 0.053 0.036
(0.101) (0.102) (0.100) (0.104)
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City -0.184* -0.187* -0.188* -0.195*
(0.105) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
Log of Estate Value 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.071***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder 0.085 0.090 0.065 0.146**
(0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.063)
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank 0.042 0.047 0.030 0.081
(0.095) (0.095) (0.098) (0.093)
Deceased is Parent of Head, or Head/Wife with Prime Aged Child 0.111
(0.074)
No Obvious Income Source 0.143**
(0.058)
Deceased Lives Outside Family of Origin -0.083
(0.099)
Observations 492 492 492 492
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 7: Determinants of Will Writing by Group, Deceased is Parent of Head 
 








Age at Death 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City -0.187* -0.267** -0.165 -0.149 -0.242 -0.077 -0.187
(0.106) (0.132) (0.190) (0.154) (0.152) (0.244) (0.116)
Log of Estate Value 0.067*** 0.080*** 0.055 0.050** 0.103*** 0.082*** 0.048
(0.019) (0.022) (0.042) (0.023) (0.034) (0.024) (0.030)
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write -0.087 -0.112 0.001 -0.089 -0.124 -0.097 -0.069
(0.076) (0.084) (0.175) (0.131) (0.097) (0.081) (0.141)
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write 0.047 -0.117 0.347*** -0.180 0.135 0.000 0.110
(0.102) (0.139) (0.090) (0.224) (0.117) (0.123) (0.177)
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder 0.090 0.138** -0.097 0.167** 0.002
(0.056) (0.069) (0.121) (0.072) (0.090)
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank 0.047 0.066 0.067 0.013 0.137 0.079
(0.095) (0.113) (0.171) (0.138) (0.130) (0.114)
Deceased is Parent of Head, or Head/Wife with Prime Aged Child 0.111 0.044 0.279*** 0.133 0.057 -0.020 0.314***
(0.074) (0.094) (0.101) (0.093) (0.124) (0.103) (0.105)
Observations 492 382 110 283 209 299 193
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%    47
Table 8: Determinants of Will Writing by Group, Deceased Lives Outside Family of Origin 
 








Age at Death 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City -0.188* -0.267** -0.141 -0.147 -0.249 -0.074 -0.189
(0.106) (0.133) (0.195) (0.153) (0.154) (0.258) (0.116)
Log of Estate Value 0.066*** 0.080*** 0.039 0.051** 0.104*** 0.082*** 0.049*
(0.019) (0.022) (0.043) (0.024) (0.034) (0.024) (0.030)
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write -0.085 -0.113 0.040 -0.094 -0.124 -0.097 -0.063
(0.076) (0.083) (0.176) (0.130) (0.097) (0.082) (0.140)
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write 0.053 -0.117 0.365*** -0.196 0.146 0.000 0.131
(0.100) (0.139) (0.085) (0.222) (0.115) (0.124) (0.171)
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder 0.065 0.135* -0.132 0.151* -0.024
(0.060) (0.078) (0.124) (0.079) (0.094)
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank 0.030 0.065 0.040 -0.003 0.119 0.051
(0.098) (0.116) (0.180) (0.141) (0.136) (0.115)
Deceased Lives Outside Family of Origin -0.083 -0.001 -0.264 -0.039 -0.160 -0.010 -0.100
(0.099) (0.123) (0.166) (0.114) (0.188) (0.337) (0.107)
Observations 492 382 110 283 209 299 193
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 9: Determinants of Will Writing by Group, Deceased Has No Income Source 
 
 








Age at Death 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City -0.195* -0.264** -0.125 -0.167 -0.244 -0.089 -0.185
(0.106) (0.132) (0.188) (0.156) (0.153) (0.248) (0.117)
Log of Estate Value 0.071*** 0.082*** 0.045 0.053** 0.115*** 0.082*** 0.058*
(0.019) (0.022) (0.043) (0.024) (0.035) (0.024) (0.031)
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write -0.102 -0.114 -0.051 -0.111 -0.135 -0.098 -0.122
(0.075) (0.083) (0.167) (0.126) (0.097) (0.081) (0.137)
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write 0.036 -0.111 0.321*** -0.215 0.127 -0.004 0.095
(0.104) (0.139) (0.109) (0.224) (0.120) (0.125) (0.181)
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder 0.146** 0.161** -0.012 0.211** 0.072
(0.063) (0.076) (0.132) (0.083) (0.097)
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank 0.081 0.079 0.063 0.050 0.160 0.113
(0.093) (0.112) (0.176) (0.138) (0.126) (0.116)
No Obvious Income Source 0.143** 0.087 0.145 0.093 0.252*** 0.048 0.207**
(0.058) (0.094) (0.106) (0.077) (0.081) (0.129) (0.080)
Observations 492 382 110 283 209 299 193
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  49
Table 10: Determinants of a Match to the Census 
(1) (2) (3)
Whole Sample Males Only Females Only
Agricultural Occupation 0.153*** 0.169**
(0.054) (0.073)
No Occupation or Occupation Uncertain (e.g. Widow) 0.036 0.023
(0.037) (0.020)




Natural Log of Estate Value 0.008 0.004 0.019
(0.008) (0.007) (0.022)
Deceased is Female 0.006
(0.036)
Resided in Enniskillen 0.006 0.029* -0.042
(0.031) (0.018) (0.090)
Probate / Administration in Dublin 0.028 0.040** -0.012
(0.020) (0.017) (0.067)
Wrote Will 0.005 -0.007 0.063
(0.020) (0.018) (0.065)
Years Between Census Date and Probate Date 0.002 0.004 -0.003
(0.008) (0.007) (0.025)
Observations 530 404 126
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Omitted Categories: Professional Occupation, Male, Residence Outside of Enniskillen, Probate in Armagh, Intestate  50
Table 11: Vital Statistics for Males, By Age 
Age Group Males









0-4 3299 39.4 130 390 0 0%
5-9 3352 3.9 13 39 0 0%
10-14 3437 2.9 10 30 0 0%
15-19 3449 4.8 17 51 1 2%
20-24 3189 7.1 23 69 1 1%
25-34 4709 9.0 42 126 11 9%
35-44 3431 10.6 36 108 19 18%
45-54 2854 15.6 45 135 41 30%
55-64 2483 29.5 73 219 69 32%
65-74 1413 63.1 89 267 67 25%
75-84 559 140.0 78 234 58 25%
85+ 110 317.1 35 105 24 23%
Total 32285 591 1773 291 16%
Total 25 and up  15559 398 1194 289 24% 
 
Table 12: Vital Statistics for Females, By Age 
Age Group Females









0-4 3198 35.0 112 336 0 0%
5-9 3265 4.8 16 48 0 0%
10-14 3308 3.9 13 39 0 0%
15-19 3490 6.0 21 63 0 0%
20-24 3330 6.6 22 66 1 2%
25-34 4926 8.6 42 126 0 0%
35-44 3654 10.8 39 117 7 6%
45-54 3214 14.9 48 144 11 8%
55-64 2671 29.6 79 237 25 11%
65-74 1388 67.2 93 279 16 6%
75-84 583 142.2 83 249 16 6%
85+ 120 292.6 35 105 5 5%
Total 33147 603 1809 81 4%
Total 25- 16556 419 1257 80 6%    51





Beneficiary Info Number of Sons
Log of Estate Value -12.642 -15.550** -15.182*
(7.825) (7.760) (7.759)
Age at Death 0.428 0.091 0.079
(0.630) (0.654) (0.654)
Probated Will -12.104 -17.280 -15.118
(21.052) (20.625) (20.624)
Administrated Will 20.088 20.872 26.051
(37.397) (36.722) (36.782)
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Male -40.093* -44.410* -45.409*
(22.788) (23.104) (23.135)
Dummy=1 if Household contains Servants -28.035 -13.911 -11.720
(20.341) (20.234) (20.293)
Dummy=1 if Can Read and Write 32.510 27.497 27.537
(32.356) (31.728) (31.932)
Dummy=1 if Can Read but Cannot Write -18.268 -26.252 -30.600
(42.259) (41.511) (41.708)
Dummy=1 if Deceased is Landholder 104.355*** 82.971*** 81.881***
(23.695) (23.947) (23.939)
Dummy=1 if Landholder Blank 13.858 -9.687 -15.932
(42.729) (42.487) (42.589)
Dummy=1 if Deceased Lived in a City -58.039 -42.426 -37.421
(41.441) (40.819) (40.890)
Children Inherit 51.835* 42.302
(31.298) (38.249)
Wife and Children Inherit 41.374 29.987
(31.764) (38.438)
Wife and Other Relatives Inherit -21.341 -21.803
(29.249) (29.226)
Number of Sons 34.035***
(12.106)






3 or More Sons 46.461
(42.200)
Constant 182.539*** 203.530*** 239.537***
(59.952) (58.890) (66.699)
Observations 492 492 492
R-squared 0.100 0.150 0.160
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Figure 1: Raw Data Example 
A.  Record from Calendar of Probates 
a.  12 September 1902 Probate of the Will of Christopher Armstrong late of Ballylucas Co. Fermanagh Farmer who died 
17 May 1901 granted at Dublin to Mary Armstrong the Widow Effects £20. 
B.  Information from the Census 
a.  Form N: Enumerator’s Abstract for a Townland or Street 
Ballylucas – A town or village, not a city or urban district: 14 Families, 59 Residents (34 Males, 25 Women), 42 
are Roman Catholic, 17 are Protestant Episcopal, None have other Religious Professions (also includes 
information on location within Fermanagh such as the Poor Law Union)  
b.  Form A: Return of Household Members 
 
  
c.  Form B.1. Household and Building Return 
1 State whether Private Dwelling, Public-house etc: Private Dwelling
2 Number of Out-Offices and Farmsteadings (e.g. Piggery): 7
3 WALLS: If Walls are of Stone, Brick, or Concrete enter 1; if they are Mud, Wood, or 
other perishable material enter 0
1
4 ROOF: If Roof is of Slate, Iron or Tiles, enter 1; if it is Thatch, Wood or other 
perishable material enter 0
0
5 ROOMS: For each House with 1 Room only enter 1, For Houses with 2,3,or 4 
Rooms enter 2, 5 or 6 Rooms enter 3, etc…
3
6 Windows in Front: State the exact Number of Windows in Front of House: 5
7 Total the Figures in 3-6 (housepoints):9
8 CLASS OF HOUSE: If Total is 1 or 2 enter "4th"; 3, 4, or 5, enter "3rd", 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, or 11 enter "2nd", 12 or over enter "1st":
2nd
9 Name of the Head of Family Christy Armstrong
10 Number of Persons who were sick on 31st March 1901: 0
11 Name of the Landholder (if any) on whose Holding the House is situated Christy Armstrong  
  First Name  Surname   Relation to  Religious  Education  Sex  Profession or  Marriage  Birth   
     Head   Profession   Age   Occupation    Place 
  Christopher    Armstrong        Head        CI            RW      50       M          Farmer           Married    Fermanagh 
  Mary       Armstrong        Wife         CI            RW      40       F            None           Married      Fermanagh 
  John C.      Armstrong         Son          CI            RW       8       M          Scholar          Not Married    Fermanagh 
  Archibald     Armstrong     Brother        CI            RW      30       M          Farmer          Not Married      Fermanagh 
  Patrick       McCahery     Servant        RC             RW      27       M     Farm Servant       Not Married    Fermanagh   53
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Figure 5: Age Frequencies 
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  The goal of this Appendix is to investigate the effect of wealth on the benefit of 
writing a will according to the altruism model.   
 
Assume two children 1 and 2, with endowments  1 E  and  2 E .   
The potential testator, i, has a wealth of amount  i W to divide between these two children 
by giving bequests of amount  1 b and  2 b .  Writing a will requires a lawyers fee of amount 
i l , and a psychic cost of  i p .  There is no psychic cost in the absence of a will. 
 
Assume his utility is measured by the equation  ( ) ( )( ) 11 22 log log i UE b E b p • =+ ++ − .  
In other words he is an altruist who values the utility of his two children equally and is 
subject to a psychic cost that enters the utility function linearly. 
 
Under intestacy his bequests are determined by the state as  1 2
i W
b =  and  2 2
i W
b =  
 
Utility under intestacy is  () 12 log log
22
ii WW




Is he writes a will, he chooses  1 b and  2 b  to solve the optimization problem: 
() ( )
12 ,1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 log log . . , , 0 bb i i i Max E b E b p st b b l W b b ++ +− + + = >  
 
Substituting in the constraint gives us:  
() ( )
1 11 2 1 log log bi i i Max E b E W l b p ++ +− −−  
 
Interior Solution 
























We can see from this that a child’s bequest is decreasing in his own endowment and 
increasing in the endowment of his sibling. 
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After the transfer, each child’s resources equal: 
12
2
ii EEWl + +−
 
This is the standard implication of the altruism model.  Namely, that the altruist divides 
the entire set of resources evenly across the children. 
 
Substituting this into the utility function, we find that 
 







++− ⎛⎞ •= − ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
 
Note that this is only defined so long as  12 0 ii EEWl + +− > .  This implies that if 
lawyer’s fees are larger than the endowments of parents and children the decision is 
meaningless.    We can assume that if  ii lW > the individual cannot write a will and will 
die intestate with certainty. 
 
Corner Solution Case 
If we assume that 21 EE > , we have an interior solution so long as the bequest to the 




>  or so long as  21 ii Wl E E − >− .  In words, as long as the 
bequeathable amount is greater than the difference in the endowments. 
 
If    21 ii Wl E E −<− , a testator will maximize his utility by giving the entire bequest to 
the poorer child.   
 
With a corner solution, after the transfer child 1’s resources will be:  1 ii EWl +− , child 2’s 
resources will be  2 E . 
Utility under testacy is:   () ( ) ( ) 12 log log ii UE W l E p •= + − + −  
 
The will writing decision: 
 
If  21 ii Wl E E −>− : 
 
The potential testator will write a will if:  
12






++− ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ −> + + + ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
 
If  21 ii Wl E E −<− : 
 
The potential testator will write a will if: 
 





EWl E p E E ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ +− + −> + + + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠





Because of the complicated role of W, it is difficult to take and sign derivatives.  Instead, 
I perform a series of simulations that look at how the net benefit of writing a will changes 
as wealth changes.  For these simulations, I drop the psychic cost,  i p , as it only serves to 
shift the net benefits down and has no impact on the dynamics. 
  
Case 1:  Low cost relative to endowments, endowments close together (always an interior 
solution). 
Net Benefit of Will 



























































































































The high utility value of the cost dominates when wealth is low, making will writing 
unattractive.  As wealth increases, the cost becomes small relative to wealth, and will 
writing grows more attractive but the distribution under intestacy and the distribution 
under testacy converge making will writing pointless.  With these costs and endowments, 
no level of wealth will lead to a will.   61
 
Case 2: Low cost relative to endowments.  Endowments are not too far apart. 
Net Benefit of Will
























































































































This individual begins as a will writer giving all to one child.  As wealth increases, he 
moves to an interior solution.  When wealth increases further he becomes intestate.  He 
switches to intestacy because the utility cost of the financial cost exceeds the utility gain 
from distributing optimally.   
 
Case 3: Low cost relative to endowments, endowments far apart.  
 
Net Benefit of Will

























































































































As wealth increases, will writing grows more attractive for low levels of wealth.  In this 
part of the graph, we have a corner solution where all assets go to one child.  Will writing   62
is increasingly attractive because giving all of the added wealth to a poorer child with a 
higher marginal utility of wealth adds more value than giving half to the poorer child and 
half to the richer child.   Subsequently, the value of a will falls over time because as 
wealth increases the intestate succession distribution converges to the will distribution.  
In the limit, this individual will be intestate because the cost cannot be justified for 
distributions that are practically identical. 
 
Case 4:  High cost of will writing relative to endowments.  Endowments are far apart. 
Net Benefit of Will











































































































In this case, for low levels of wealth, increasing wealth makes will writing more 
attractive.  This individual is initially intestate, but switches to writing a will.  The switch 
occurs because the utility cost of the cost of a will is prohibitively high at low levels of 
wealth, but declines as wealth increases.  A similar pattern would emerge if the cost of 
will writing was greater than the wealth of the potential testator. 
 
Combining these cases, we find that the effect of wealth is indeterminate.  We can find 
circumstances where growing wealth leads an intestate individual to write a will, and we 
can find circumstances where growing wealth leads a testator to die intestate.  All cases 
share the dynamic that in the limit, when wealth gets extremely large relative to costs and 
endowments, individuals will be intestate.  This is the case because the distribution under 
intestacy converges to the distribution under a will and therefore the cost cannot be 
justified.  This result would be even more pronounced if psychic costs were incorporated 
into the model. 
 
The only case where increasing wealth leads an intestate individual to write a will relies 
on very specific assumptions about costs and only holds for low levels of wealth.  For 
most individuals, costs are likely to be small relative to wealth.  As a result, we can 
conclude that for a wide class of individuals, the altruism model leads to the prediction 
that the effect of wealth on will writing should be negative.   
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Appendix B 
 
In this appendix, I compare the values of variables coded from the Census to data 
from the Census report to put the sample in context.  This comparison is presented in 
Table B1.  The Table compares Census data on all of Ireland (column 1), to Census Data 
on the Provence of Ulster (column 2 – the six counties of Northern Ireland plus three 
adjacent Counties), Census data on Co. Fermanagh (column 3), the entire population of 
towns where someone in the deceased sample lived (column 4), the families the deceased 
lived in (column 5), and the deceased themselves (column 6).  The data in Columns 1-3 
come from the official Census Report (Census of Ireland 1901, 1902), while the data in 
Columns 4-6 are tabulated from the matched sample.   
  A number of patterns are evident in the Table.  As mentioned earlier, 
Fermanagh’s religious split is more Catholic than the rest of Ulster, but more Protestant 
than Ireland as a whole.  The Protestant denominational split is quite different from the 
remainder of Ireland.  Fermanagh has more Methodists and Episcopalians than the rest of 
Ulster, and fewer Presbyterians.  The quality of the housing stock and literacy of the 
population are broadly similar to the remainder of the country with the exception that 
Fermanagh has a lower proportion of first class houses than the Country or Provence.   
This is probably due to the predominantly rural nature of the County – First Class houses 
tended to be in cities.  When we compare data from the Census Report to data from the 
families of the deceased sample, we observe that the matched sample is more Protestant 
and less Catholic than Fermangh overall and lives in higher class houses.  This is 
consistent with individuals who leave estates coming from richer families. When we look 
at the occupational breakdowns of the population, we see that the deceased individuals 
were more likely to be from agricultural families and families where the individuals are 
older.   In the final column, we show attributes of the deceased themselves.  This is a 
much older sample than the individuals represented in the earlier columns.  Seventy-two 
percent of the deceased are 55 and over.  About 78% of the sample is male largely as a 
result of the near exclusion of married women from estate distribution.  The famous Irish 
marriage patterns are also evident in the sample.  At death 29% are never married while 
48% are married and 23% are widowed.  64
Table B1: Comparisons Between Census and Matched Samples 
Whole of Ireland Ulster Fermanagh Town Sample Family Sample Deceased Sample
(Census Report) (Census Report) (Census Report) (Matched Data) (Matched Data) (Matched Data)
Population 4,458,775              1,582,826              65,430                   23,683                   2165 494
Families 910,256                 NA NA 5,364                     482 482
Houses 858,158                 NA NA 5,033                     482 482
   
Read and Write 79% 79% 78% NA 82% 81%
Read Only 7% 9% 9% NA 6% 9%
Neither Read Nor Write 14% 13% 13% NA 12% 9%
Roman Catholic 74% 44% 55% 55% 44% 42%
Protestant Episcopalians 13% 23% 35% 35% 41% 41%
P r e s b y t e r i a n s 1 0 % 2 7 %2 %3 %3 %4 %
Methodists 1% 3% 7% 7% 11% 13%
A l l  O t h e r  D e n o m i n a t i o n s 1 %3 %0 %0 %0 %0 %
1st Class 9% 8% 4% NA 15% 11%
2nd Class 61% 65% 63% NA 71% 71%
3rd Class 29% 27% 31% NA 14% 18%
4 t h  C l a s s 1 %1 %1 %N A0 %0 %
Sick at their Own Homes per 10K 33.4 35.4 47.1 NA 111 365
0.3% 0.4% 0.5%  1.1% 3.7%
Marital Status of Population Over 15
Married 38% NA NA NA 32% 47%
Widowed 10% NA NA NA 10% 24%
Never Married 53% NA NA NA 58% 29%
Born in Same County 86% NA NA NA 86% 87%
Irish Born from Different County 11% NA NA NA 13% 12%
Born in England 2% NA NA NA 1% 1%
Born in Scotland 1% NA NA NA 0% 1%
Born in Rest of World 1% NA NA NA 1% 0%
Professional Class 3% NA NA NA 2% 3%
Domestic Class 5% NA NA NA 7% 0%
Commercial Class 2% NA NA NA 1% 1%
Agricultural Class 20% NA NA NA 35% 65%
Industrial Class 14% NA NA NA 9% 10%
Indefinite or Unproductive Class 56% NA NA NA 46% 20%
Under 20 41% NA NA NA 26% 0%
20-55 Years Old 45% NA NA NA 47% 28%
55 Years and Up 14% NA NA NA 27% 72%
Male NA NA NA 51% 50% 78%
Female NA NA NA 49% 50% 22% 
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